Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University

Schulich Law Scholars
Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

Faculty Scholarship

2020

NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government
and Service Employees’ Union’ and Communications, Energy and
Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Native Child and Family
Services of Toronto
Naiomi Metallic
Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law, naiomi.metallic@dal.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/scholarly_works
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration
Commons, Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons, and the Other Law Commons

Recommended Citation
“NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government and Service Employees’ Union’ and
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Native Child and Family Services of
Toronto” in Kent McNeil & Naiomi Metallic, eds, Judicial Tales Retold: Reimagining Indigenous Rights
Jurisprudence, (Saskatchewan: Canadian Native Law Reporter, Indigenous Law Center, 2020).

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Schulich Law Scholars.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press by an authorized administrator of
Schulich Law Scholars. For more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

NIL/TU,O and Native Child v BCGSEU and CEPUC

21

NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society (Appellant)
v
B.C. Government and Service Employees’ Union; (Respondent)
and
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (Appellant)
v
Native Child and Family Services of Toronto (Respondent)
[Indexed as: NIL/TU,O and Native Child v BCGSEU and CEPUC]
Indigenous Nations Court, Metallic J, February 1, 2020*
Neutral Citation: 2020 INC 2
In NIL/TU,O and Native Child, the Supreme Court of Canada held that unions applying
for certification to represent employees of Indigenous-run child and family agencies ought to
be certified under provincial labour relations legislation. The majority in both cases applied
a presumptive rule that labour relations are generally provincial matters. This presumption
was not displaced by the fact that both agencies were Indigenous-run organizations. The
Indigenous nature of the organizations, their clientele, staff, and governance, or their own
preferences for labour regimes made no difference to the Court’s analysis.
Held: Appeals Allowed.
1.

The appeals should be allowed. Treating Indigenous peoples merely as subjects has,
for too long, facilitated both federal and provincial government neglect of matters
that are of fundamental importance to Indigenous nations and has failed to protect
Indigenous communities against assimilative forces. In other words, the old approach
has caused Indigenous communities harm. Nowhere is this perhaps more apparent
than in the context of child welfare. The Supreme Court failed to be sensitive in these
cases to the unique Indigenous context and the interplay of a number of constitutional
principles, including treaty federalism, federalism, subsidiarity, the presumption of
conformity with international law, substantive equality, reconciliation, and the honour
of the Crown. Indigenous groups are governments in their own right, with their own
law-making powers and responsibilities. The Canadian conception of federalism, read in
harmony with other constitutional principles, is capable of accommodating this change.

Metallic J:**
1.

Introduction

[1]
We are called upon to rule on appeals from the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada (SCC) in NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C.
Government and Service Employees’ Union and Communications, Energy and
*
**

The Indigenous Nations Court (INC) is not a real court and this is not an actual appeal.
Naiomi Metallic, the author of this “judgment,” is an Assistant Professor and the Chancellor’s
Chair in Aboriginal Law and Policy at the Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. She is
not a judge.
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Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Native Child and Family Services of Toronto.1
Both cases were framed in the courts below as involving the question of whether,
as a matter of division of jurisdictional powers in ss 91 and 92 of the Constitution
Act, 1867, provincial or federal labour laws ought to apply to employees of
Indigenous-run agencies providing services to Indigenous clientele in the area of
child welfare services. In the courts below, the NIL/TU,O agency, serving seven
First Nations communities situated on reserve lands in British Columbia, resisted
the application of provincial laws in favour of the federal labour regime applying to
its employees. Conversely, Native Child, serving the urban Indigenous community
in Toronto, resisted federal jurisdiction over its labour relations in favour of
provincial jurisdiction.
[2]
All the judges of the SCC agreed in the result that provincial labour laws
ought to apply to both agencies. All agreed that the past division-of-powers precedent
established that jurisdiction over labour relations is presumptively provincial and
only exceptionally federal. The only point of disagreement between the judges was
when the exception is triggered. A majority of six judges preferred an approach that
first assessed whether the day-to-day functions of the agencies indicated sufficient
federal involvement in their operations in order to trigger the exception. Assuming
this was shown, a second assessment would occur asking whether the nature of the
activities of the agencies (here the delivery of culturally-informed child welfare
services to an Indigenous clientele) went to the ‘core of Indianess’ of the federal
constitutional power over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” in s 91(24)
of the Constitution Act, 1867. The majority judges concluded that the provinces
retained ultimate decision-making control over these agencies under provincial child
welfare law and that federal involvement was less prominent. There was, therefore,
no need to proceed to a ‘core of Indianess’ analysis. In separate reasons concurring
in the result, a minority of judges preferred an analytical approach that would go
straight to a ‘core of Indianess’ consideration. Assessing this ‘core’ narrowly, these
judges determined that child welfare services delivered by Indigenous peoples and
aimed at Indigenous clientele were not within this core.
[3]
The disagreement between the judges at the SCC appears to only be one of
degree. Both camps focused exclusively on determining, as between the federal
and provincial governments, who exercised the most control over the operations
of these agencies, and in the case of the minority judges, whether the exercise of
federal control in the circumstances went to the essence of federal power to control
“Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.” There was no consideration of the
perspective of either of these Indigenous agencies or the bodies that govern them on
which labour regime they wanted. Nor was any mention made of the possibility that
Indigenous communities could control their own labour relations or child welfare
services and why this might be important to the vitality of these communities.
[4]
1

It is apparent from their written reasons that the SCC was unprepared to
NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v B.C. Government and Service Employees’ Union,
2010 SCC 45 [NIL/TU,O] and Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada v
Native Child and Family Services of Toronto, 2010 SCC 46 [Native Child].
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entertain the notion of creating space for the exercise of Indigenous choice or
jurisdiction within s 91(24). This is clear from the majority judges’ statement that
“[t]here is no reason why, as a matter of principle, the jurisdiction of an entity’s
labour relations should be approached differently when s 91(24) is at issue. The
fundamental nature of the inquiry is—and should be—the same as for any other
head of power.”2 On this, we disagree.
[5]
On their face, these cases do not raise any issues of Aboriginal or treaty rights
or invoke s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. This might lead some to question
why these appeals would be heard by the Indigenous Nations Court. The answer
is simple: when it comes to issues of the constitutional division of powers between
the federal and provincial governments, the jurisdiction of Indigenous nations is the
other side of the coin. The interpretation of the Canadian constitution as dividing
up all the jurisdictional space between the federal and provincial governments
leaves no jurisdictional space for Canada’s Indigenous peoples and effectively
erases their inherent right to choose their own destinies as peoples. A number of
considerations, many of these modern interpretive and constitutional principles,
require us to now acknowledge that questions of federal and provincial jurisdictional
powers relating to Indigenous peoples inevitably implicate issues of Indigenous selfdetermination and self-government.3 Further, we must recognize that Indigenous
self-determination is inextricably tied to the well-being of Indigenous peoples.
[6]
For the last 153 years, Canadian division-of-powers cases have been decided
as though the inherent right of self-determination held by Indigenous peoples did
not exist, and the only jurisdiction Indigenous peoples are capable of possessing
is that (seldom) granted to them by other governments. The SCC has also granted
the provinces powers that are virtually concurrent with federal powers in relation
to Indigenous peoples. It is now clear that this approach contributes to the harms
that Indigenous peoples continue to experience in this country. Most seriously, it
has aided and abetted in equal measures the assimilation and neglect of Indigenous
peoples by Canadian governments. In the context of child welfare, policies of
assimilation and government neglect have combined to contribute to the devastating
overrepresentation of Indigenous children in state care. Additionally, in the contexts
of employment, labour, and human rights jurisdiction, the SCC’s approach to
2
3

NIL/TU,O, ibid at para 20.
Self-determination is the right of Indigenous peoples to choose their destinies. In Canada, it
means that First Nations, Inuit, and Métis have the right to negotiate the terms of their relationship
with Canada and choose governmental structures that meet their needs: see Report of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996)
(RCAP), vol 2, pt 1 c 3 at 158 [RCAP]). Self-determination includes the right to self-government:
ibid at 159; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295
(Annex), UN GAOR, 61st Sess, Supp No 49, vol III, UN Doc A/61/ 49 (2008) 15, art 4 [UNDRIP].
Self-government is the ability of Indigenous peoples to enforce their own rules, resolve disputes,
problem-solve, and establish their own governing institutions to carry out these tasks: see Stephen
Cornell, Catherine Curtis & Miriam Jorgenen, The Concept of Governance and Its Implications
for First Nations – A Report to the British Columbia Regional Vice-Chief, Assembly of First
Nations, JOPNA no 2004-02 (Cambridge, MA: The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic
Development, 2004). For simplicity, we will simply refer to ‘self-determination’ in the remainder
of this judgment; however, this is intended to include the Indigenous right to self-government.
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s 91(24) has resulted in a confusing maze of federal and provincial laws and
tribunals having jurisdiction over different sub-units of an Indigenous government.
[7]
While the current approach to s 91(24) is supported by long-standing
precedent, it is based on an interpretation of our Constitution that is at odds with
the numerous principles that Canadian governments and courts have both affirmed
are fundamental to our legal system and our identity as a country. These include
‘treaty federalism’, conformity with the Charter and the principles of federalism,
subsidiarity, reconciliation and the honour of the Crown, and the presumption of
conformity with international law. These principles demand a different interpretation
of s 91(24).

2.

Analysis

A.

The Current Approach
i. No Space for Indigenous Jurisdiction

[8]
Since Confederation, the courts have interpreted s 91(24) as according the
federal government nearly unlimited power over “Indians, and Lands reserved for
the Indians.” (Despite the use of the word “Indians” in s 91(24), we will use the
term “Indigenous peoples” to refer to those peoples contemplated in the provision,
as this reflects the fact that Inuit, Métis, and ‘non-status Indians’ have been deemed
to be within its scope and because it reflects the terminology used in the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.4) It is clear that, from
Confederation to the present, no contemplation was given by our courts to the federal
power being shared or limited by decisions or laws made by Indigenous peoples,
despite the two preceding centuries of ‘nation-to-nation’ and treaty relations wherein
the British recognized and committed themselves to respecting Indigenous claims to
sovereignty and their lands.5 This judicial amnesia is evidenced in St. Catherine’s
Milling & Lumber Co. v R, where the Privy Council described the rights of the
Indigenous people in their unsurrendered lands as having been granted to them by

4
5

See Reference re: British North America Act, 1867 (UK), s 91, [1939] SCR 104 [Re Eskimos];
Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [2016] 1 SCR 99 [Daniels];
UNDRIP, ibid.
See Brian Slattery, “The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” in Menno Boldt
& J. Anthony Long, eds, The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 114; Bruce Ryder, “The Demise and Rise of the
Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First
Nations” (1991) McGill LJ 308 (Ryder); James Sákéj Youngblood Henderson, “Empowering
Treaty Federalism” (1994) 58 Sask L Rev 241 (Henderson); John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous
Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), c 1; Brian Slattery, “The Aboriginal
Constitution” (2015) 67 SCLR (3d) 319; Joshua Nichols, “Sui Generis Sovereignties: An
Investigation into the Relationship between the Principles of Treaty Interpretation and the
Conceptual Framework of Canadian Sovereignty,” in Oonagh E. Fitzgerald, Valerie Hughes
& Mark Jewett, eds, Reflections on Canada’s Past, Present and Future in International Law
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2018), 131 [Nichols, “Sui Generis
Sovereignties”]; Alan Hanna, “Spaces for Sharing: Searching for Indigenous Law on the Canadian
Legal Landscape” (2018) 51 UBC L Rev 105.
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the Crown and entirely “dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign.”6 This
approach to s 91(24) assumed that the Crown obtained absolute sovereignty over
all land and power in Canada through the doctrine of discovery and its associated
legal fiction of terra nullius.7
[9]
Although in the last half-century there has been some acknowledgement of
Aboriginal rights at common law,8 which are now recognized and affirmed by s
35, this has not lead to a re-examination of Crown sovereignty or s 91(24), nor to
any real coming to terms with the doctrines of discovery and terra nullius. On the
contrary, in its first case on s 35, R v Sparrow, the SCC emphasized that “there was
from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed
the underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown.”9 As observed by Kent
McNeil in relation to Sparrow, “[t]he colonial vision of the Canadian Constitution,
based on parliamentary sovereignty and exhaustive distribution of powers between
the federal and provincial governments, was still influencing the judges.”10 The
SCC has thus far evaded robust recognition of the right to self-government.11 In
this regard, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has stated that s 35
jurisprudence continues “to subjugate Aboriginal peoples to an absolute sovereign
Crown.”12
6
7

8
9
10
11

12

(1888) 14 App Cas 46 [St. Catherine’s Milling]. See Kent McNeil, Flawed Precedent: The St.
Catherine’s Case and Aboriginal Title (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019).
See John Borrows, “Canada’s Colonial Constitution,” in John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds,
The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of Historic Treaties (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2017), 17 [Borrows, “Canada’s Colonial Constitution”]; Nichols, supra note
5; Joshua Ben David Nichols, Reconciliation without Recollection? An Investigation of the
Foundations of Aboriginal Law in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020).
See Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313.
R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1103.
Kent McNeil, “Envisaging Constitutional Space for Aboriginal Governments,” (1993) 19 Queen’s
LJ 95 at 126. See also Borrows, “Canada’s Colonial Constitution,” supra note 7, and Nichols,
“Sui Generis Sovereignties,” supra note 5.
In R v Pamajewon, [1996] 2 SCR 821 at para 24, the Supreme Court held, “without deciding that
s 35(1) includes self-government claims,” that if self-government was included in s 35, any such
rights would have to be proven by the same test used to prove other Aboriginal rights, established
in R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507. The restriction placed on the right of Aboriginal selfgovernment in Pamajewon has been roundly criticized as unduly limiting First Nations’ ability
to self-govern: see, for example, BW Morse, “Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal Self-Government
and the Supreme Court in R. v. Pamajewon” (1997) 42 McGill LJ 1011; Peter Scott Vicaire,
“Two Roads Diverged: A Comparative Analysis of Indigenous Rights in a North American
Constitutional Context” (2013) 58 McGill LJ 607 at 656–657; JE Dalton, “Exceptions, Excuses
and Norms: Aboriginal Self-Determination in Canada: Protections Afforded by the Judiciary and
Government” (2006) 21:1 Can J L & Soc’y 11 at 19–20. However, the Court has yet to revisit its
ruling, although it has had at least two opportunities to do so. In 2008, the Court denied leave to
hear a case which would have required it to squarely reconsider its decision in Pamajewon: see
Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation v National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation
and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) et al., 2008 CanLII 18945 (SCC). In
2011, it denied leave to hear a case that would have allowed it to directly address the right of selfgovernment again: see Chief Mountain et al. v Attorney General of Canada, et al., 2013 CanLII
53406 (SCC).
Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future – Summary of the Final Report of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
Canada, 2015) at 202–203.
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ii. Ample Space for Provincial Jurisdiction
[10] Not only have the courts ignored the possibility of Indigenous jurisdiction
in their interpretation of s 91(24), but they have consistently eroded the exclusive
federal jurisdictional power over Indigenous peoples by according significant
powers to provincial governments in this area. This is contrary to what many
regard as the main purpose of s 91(24): to protect Indigenous peoples’ lands and
interests from encroachment by local settlers, whose interest in acquiring lands
and jurisdiction for purposes of settlement was in direct conflict with preserving
the lands and interests of the Indigenous peoples.13
[11]
This objective of protecting Indigenous peoples from colonial encroachment
has its roots in the legal framework established through the nation-to-nation, treaty
relationships that had unfolded during the 200 years leading to confederation.14
Referred to as ‘treaty federalism’, this framework positions s 91(24) as empowering
the federal government to protect Indigenous interests without granting it plenary
power to control all aspects of Indigenous peoples’ lives. Rather, the provision
empowers the federal government to enter treaties with Indigenous peoples
to achieve consensual arrangements for harmonious co-existence and shared
responsibilities, recognizing that Indigenous peoples have the right to selfdetermination, including self-government and the right to consent to decisions
that affect them.15
[12] Unfortunately, treaty federalism has yet to be embraced by Canadian
courts. Instead, the courts’ preoccupation with prioritizing provincial interests
can be seen as early as the first two s 91(24) cases of St. Catherine’s Milling16
and Ontario Mining Co. v Seybold.17 In these cases, the Privy Council interpreted
sections 91(24) and 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867 as preventing the federal
government from implementing its treaty promises to set aside reserve land, and
instead required provincial involvement in the process. At the same time, however,
the Privy Council held that provinces had no strict legal duty to cooperate with
the federal government in the implementation of treaty promises. Based on these
decisions, courts would neither compel Canada to unilaterally fulfil a treaty promise
relating to land nor compel provinces to cooperate with Canada’s attempt to fulfil
such treaty promises.18
[13] Post-WWII would see the SCC carve out even more constitutional space
for provincial jurisdiction in relation to Indigenous peoples. At this time, the federal
13
14
15
16
17
18

See Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2014 Student Edition (Toronto: Thomson Reuters
Canada Limited, 2014), c 28 at 2-3; Cathy Bell, “Have You Ever Wondered Where s 91(24) Comes
From?” (2003) 17 Can J Const L 285.
See Henderson, supra note 5, and Borrows, “Canada’s Colonial Constitution,” supra note 7.
For more of this, see Henderson, ibid, and Nichols, “Sui Generis Sovereignties,” supra note 5.
Supra note 6.
[1903] AC 73.
See Leonard I Rotman, “Provincial Fiduciary Obligations to First Nations: the Nexus between
Governmental Power and Responsibility” (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall LJ 735. These decisions left
Indigenous treaty signatories without any legal recourse for enforcing key treaty promises for
decades.
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government took the bold step of adding a provision to the Indian Act (today s
88 of the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5) that, subject to a few exceptions,19 adopts
provincial laws of general application as federal laws applicable to Indians. We
will say more about this below, but the main effects of s 88 have been characterized
as “severely limit[ing] First Nations’ political power in Canada” and “creat[ing]
very few incentives for the federal government to work with First Nations to pass
legislation recognizing and affirming their Aboriginal and treaty rights throughout
the country.”20
[14] For the first 30 years of its existence, s 88 of the Indian Act was generally
viewed as being the sole basis for the application of provincial laws to First
Nations. However, in the 1985 case of Dick v R, the SCC decided that most
provincial laws of general application apply of their own force (ex proprio vigore)
to Indigenous peoples, relegating s 88 to a much-reduced role of reinvigorating
those provincial laws that touched on the ‘core of Indianess’ (invoking the doctrine
of interjurisdictional immunity).21 In other words, the SCC effectively converted
the problematic approach of expansive application of provincial laws permitted
by s 88 into a default constitutional rule in Dick.
[15] In the last fifty years, there have been a small number of cases where the
SCC has recognized the federal government’s exclusive law-making powers.22 The
general trend, however, has been for the SCC to give provinces ever-increasing
powers over Indigenous peoples. Most notably, in Kitkatla Band v British Columbia
(Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture),23 the SCC all but eliminated
the constitutional rule known as ‘singling out’, which prevented provinces from
passing laws that explicitly set policies in relation to Indigenous peoples (either
for their benefit or detriment).24 On the effect of this decision, Jean Leclair has
commented: “the Supreme Court confined Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction over
Indians to such a narrow compass that most aboriginal issues can now be said to
have a double aspect.”25
[16] Finally, in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia and Grassy Narrows First
Nation v Ontario (Natural Resources), the SCC reversed earlier rulings holding
that Aboriginal and treaty rights are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government, virtually obliterating the concept of a ‘core of Indianess.’26 Building
19
20
21
22

23
24
25
26

These include the terms of treaties, other federal laws, the Indian Act, and regulations and bylaws
passed thereunder.
Borrows, “Canada’s Colonial Constitution,” supra note 7 at 25; see also Kerry Wilkins, “Still
Crazy After All These Years: Section 88 of the Indian Act at Fifty” (2000) 38(2) Alta L Rev 458.
Dick v R, [1985] 2 SCR 309.
Indian status in Natural Parents v Superintendent of Child Welfare et al., [1976] 2 SCR 751;
reserve lands in Derrickson v Derrickson, [1986] 1 SCR 285; and Aboriginal and treaty rights in
Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [Delgamuukw] and R v Morris, 2006 SCC
59 [Morris].
[2002] 2 SCR 146.
See R v Sutherland, [1980] 2 SCR 451.
See Jean Leclair, “The Kitkatla Decision: Finding Jurisdictional Room to Justify Provincial
Regulation of Aboriginal Matters” (2003) 20 SCLR (2d) 1 at 31–32.
Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in]; Grassy Narrows First Nation

28

Canadian Native Law Reporter [2020] CNLR Special Edition

on Kitkatla, the Court further suggested that provincial law specifically legislating
in relation to Aboriginal title would be valid.27 Scholars have criticized these cases
for prioritizing provincial interests over the protection of Indigenous rights and
abandoning expectations that s 91(24) would be used as a vehicle to advance treaty
federalism and reconciliation.28
[17] Cumulatively, these decisions conceive the Crown as having plenary power
over Indigenous peoples and give the provinces powers over Indigenous peoples
that are essentially concurrent with federal powers.
B.

The Current Approach Causes Harm

[18] What we wish to emphasize in this section is both the damage that has
been done to Indigenous peoples by the courts’ approach to s 91(24) in general,
as well as specific harms this has caused in both the areas of child welfare and
labour relations. We believe that courts must be attentive to situations where their
interpretation of the Constitution is causing Indigenous peoples harm. Addressing
harm is central to reconciliation. The TRC defined reconciliation as “establishing
and maintaining a mutually respectful relationship between Aboriginal and nonAboriginal peoples in this country.”29 The TRC said this requires “awareness of
the past, acknowledgement of the harm that has been inflicted, atonement for the
causes, and action to change behaviour.”30 Canadian courts have acknowledged
that reconciliation with Indigenous peoples is a priority of constitutional law.31
i. Harms Caused by Federal Control
[19] The harmful impacts of interpreting s 91(24) as giving the federal
government nearly unlimited powers over Indigenous peoples and their lands have
been revealed through several recent commissions of inquiry, including the TRC.32
Pursuant to such an interpretation, the federal government passed the Indian Act
and a number of related policies aimed at attempting to assimilate First Nations,
the most notorious among these being the Indian Residential Schools (IRS) system.
Provisions in the Indian Act sanctioned the operation of these schools and the forced

27

28

29
30
31

32

v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48.
See Tsilhqot’in, ibid at para 116. One is hard-pressed to identify an area that is not overlapping these
days. Even the most stalwart area—jurisdiction over reserve land—now appears up for question.
See Nigel Bankes and Jennifer Koshan, “The Uncertain Status of the Doctrine of Interjurisdictional
Immunity on Reserve Lands,” (28 October 2014), Ablawg (blog), online: <https://ablawg.
ca/2014/10/28/the-uncertain-status-of-the-doctrine-of-interjurisdictional-immunity-on-reservelands/>.
See Borrows, “Canada’s Colonial Constitution,” supra note 7 at 31–32. See also Bruce McIvor
& Kate Gunn, “Stepping into Canada’s Shoes: Tsilhqot’in, Grassy Narrows and the Division of
Powers” (2016) 67 UNBLJ 146; Kerry Wilkins, “Life Among the Ruins: Section 91(24) After
Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows” (2017) 55 Alta L Rev 91.
Supra note 12 at 6.
Ibid at 7.
See Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 at para 1:
“The fundamental objective of the modern law of aboriginal and treaty rights is the reconciliation of
aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal peoples and their respective claims, interests and ambitions.”
See also Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] 3 SCR 103 at para 10.
See RCAP, supra note 3, vol 1, Looking Forward, Looking Back, chs 9–12, and TRC, supra note 12.

NIL/TU,O and Native Child v BCGSEU and CEPUC

29

attendance of Indigenous children (these were not formally repealed until 2014!).33
Other examples include displacement from traditional homelands, placement on
reserves, relocations and centralization, bans on cultural and spiritual practices,
replacement of traditional forms of governance, loss of language and culture and
various abuses experienced by students at Indian Day Schools, enfranchisement
provisions that robbed thousands of people of their Indian status, restrictions on
obtaining legal representation, and restrictions on the sale and trade of the harvest
from farming and hunting, to name a few.
[20]
The harms from the IRS system, chronicled by the TRC, include
physical, emotional, and sexual abuse of individual students; loss of language,
culture, traditions, and laws; loss of pride and self-respect by Indigenous peoples;
stereotyping and prejudice by non-Indigenous Canadians; and long-lasting
intergenerational impacts on families, languages, education, and health.34 The
harmful impacts of Canada’s other assimilative policies have had similar effects.
[21] Granted, the federal government passed the Indian Act in 1876 and was
already implementing it by the time of the Privy Council’s decision in St. Catherine’s
Milling, the decision confirmed the Crown’s absolute sovereignty and gave wind
to the sails of Canada’s colonial project.
ii. Harms Caused by Jurisdictional Neglect
[22] While it is obvious that the current interpretation of s 91(24) facilitated
the exercise of extraordinary control over the lives of First Nations peoples by the
federal government, the other (less-known) side of this coin is the extraordinary
neglect of Indigenous peoples’ needs and well-being that the governments’ and
courts’ interpretation of s 91(24) has facilitated.
[23] Although the Indian Act touches upon many areas of First Nations’ peoples
lives, there are in fact several policy areas over which it is largely silent, including
the areas of child welfare, social assistance, education (outside the IRS system),
housing, water, policing, emergency services, and land claims, to name a few.35 In
addition, the Indian Act also excludes application to Inuit and Métis, as well as First
Nations not registered under the Indian Act. Since Confederation, this has raised
questions about which government (federal or provincial) has the responsibility
to create legislation and policy and delivery of services in the areas covered by
these omissions.36
33
34
35
36

Indian Act, RSC 1985 c I-5, ss 114–121. Most of these were repealed by the Indian Act Amendment
and Replacement Act, SC 2014, c 38.
These various harms are discussed throughout the TRC Report. A helpful overview of policies is
provided in the introduction to the Executive Summary, supra note 12 at 1–22.
For more on this, see Janna Promislow & Naiomi Metallic, “Realizing Administrative Aboriginal
Law,” in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 3d ed (Emond
Publishing: Toronto, 2017), c 3.
The SCC eventually provided clarity by indicating that s 91(24) includes jurisdiction over Inuit (Re
Eskimos, supra note 4) and Métis and non-status Indians (Daniels, supra note 4). There continues
to be uncertainty, however, about the extent of the federal responsibility in regards to Métis and
non-status Indians. Arguably, the Supreme Court added to this uncertainty by confirming that
the federal government has no “duty to legislate” in respect of these groups (see Daniels, supra
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[24] By signalling the possibility of concurrent power over Indians and their
lands early on, the courts introduced a significant degree of uncertainty that both the
federal and provincial governments have since used to their advantage. Generally,
as it relates to matters requiring government expenditure of resources (as opposed
to the taking of resources), the provinces argue that Indigenous matters are a federal
responsibility, while the federal government argues that those areas not covered
in the Indian Act are within provincial jurisdiction. This denial of responsibility
by both levels of government is unique to s 91(24), as observed by Kent McNeil:
In other division of powers situations, the federal government and the provinces usually
fight one another for jurisdiction, each trying to amass as much authority as possible.
But when it comes to jurisdiction in relation to Aboriginal peoples, exactly the opposite
phenomenon occurs.37

[25] Such denials became especially prominent after the rise of the administrative
state post-WWII when governments began to provide basic, essential services to
citizens. These are the conditions that led to the addition of s 88 to the Indian Act.
Following WWII, the federal government was under mounting pressure to provide
essential services to First Nations, and it appears that s 88 was a unilateral attempt
to delegate this responsibility to the provinces.38 Generally, the provinces did
not accept this delegation where it required the expenditure of money for service
delivery. Instead, they insisted on cost-sharing arrangements with the federal
government, where Canada absorbed all or the majority of costs, before extending
services. This occurred only in a limited number of areas, namely, child welfare,
policing (in the 1990s), and, in Ontario, social assistance.
[26] The resulting jurisdictional arrangement in these circumstances is complex.
There is an agreement between the federal government and provincial governments
for extension of provincial laws and services to First Nations in exchange for full
or majority federal funding. Often the federal government will also have funding
agreements with First Nations to deliver these services (either through the Band
administration or agencies) in accordance with provincial laws (a phenomenon
known as ‘program devolution’). Sometimes, provincial governments will also
have agreements to recognize First Nations service agencies, like the NIL/TU,O
and Native Child, as designated service providers under provincial laws.39
[27] In those areas where provinces have been unwilling to extend their services
to First Nations, such as in the case of social assistance, assisted living, water, health
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services, emergency services, and housing, the federal government has been left
to provide such services to First Nations across the country. Canada has done so
begrudgingly; it resists adopting clear legislative standards for fear of appearing
to have accepted jurisdiction over such areas. Instead, the federal government has
‘regulated’ these areas by means of Treasury Board directives and policies and,
later, funding agreements with First Nations to deliver such services themselves.
Often, the federal government has simply imposed provincial standards via its
policies for the delivery of services on reserve, and First Nations have been bound
to follow these as a term of their funding agreements.40
[28] The above described ‘systems’ of the delivery of essential services to First
Nations have been criticized by scholars and the Auditor General of Canada as being
confusing, developed without consultation with First Nations, largely excluding
First Nations from policy development, being assimilative in nature, not responsive
to First Nations’ particular needs and circumstances, not an adequate substitute
for self-government, allowing for systemic underfunding and under-servicing of
First Nations’ essential services, making it difficult to hold federal and provincial
governments accountable, and preventing First Nations՚ access to justice in the
case of disputes over service delivery.41
[29] In our view, there is a direct link between these various problems and
harms attributed to the above described ‘systems’ and the current approaches to
s 91(24), s 88 of the Indian Act, and the SCC’s ‘constitutionalization’ in Dick of
the s 88 approach of transferring authority over “Indians” to the provinces . This
is illustrated clearly in the case of child welfare, which we discuss further below.
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[30] We note that the recent report of the National Inquiry into Missing and
Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls linked jurisdictional neglect and lack of
cooperation between governments as a key contributor to the poverty experienced
by Indigenous women which, in turn, makes them vulnerable to becoming murdered
and missing. The National Inquiry goes so far as to assert that the harms caused
by jurisdictional neglect violate the s 7 Charter rights to life, liberty, and security
of the person of Indigenous women and girls:
Canada has failed, partially through a lack of interjurisdictional cooperation, to ensure
that Indigenous Peoples have access to adequate resources and the supports necessary to
have their human dignity, life, liberty, and security protected. As this report has already
shown, the particular constitutional responsibilities for First Nations, associated with
the long-time lack of constitutional recognition of other Indigenous groups, alongside
the realities of provincial and territorial service delivery in key areas like education and
health, have all resulted in a complicated jurisdictional landscape. The complexity of
the landscape, however, doesn’t mean that rights can simply be ignored.
Interjurisdictional neglect represents a breach of relationship and responsibility, as well
as of a constitutionally protected section 7 Charter right to life, liberty, and security of the
person. Denials of protection and the failure of Canada to uphold these rights – specifically,
the right to life for Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA [Two-Spirit, lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, questioning, intersex and asexual] people – are a breach
of fundamental justice. These deficits, then, are about much more than the organization
of services, or the specifics of their delivery: they are about the foundational right to
life, liberty, and security of every Indigenous woman, girl, and 2SLGBTQQIA person.42

[31] Correlative to the mounting evidence that interjurisdictional neglect and the
imposition of provincial laws and standards is causing harm to Indigenous peoples,
there is growing scholarship and empirical data that points to a clear link between the
exercise of meaningful self-government and improvement in Indigenous peoples’
well-being.43 This is highlighted in the work of John H. Hylton, who states:
The conclusion of the analysis is inescapable—existing social programs that have been
imposed on Aboriginal people by the governments of the dominant society have failed
Aboriginal people and the Canadians who have supported them. Programs designed and
run by Aboriginal people for Aboriginal people, on the other hand, have generally proved
to be more effective and no more costly.44

iii. Specific Harms in Relation to Child Welfare
[32] Although some authors have been raising alarm bells over the impact
of the child welfare system on Indigenous children and families for decades,45
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developments in the last five years have finally made this a topic of national
attention. Recent statistics reveal that Aboriginal people account for almost half
of all children in foster care and that they are overrepresented in the child welfare
system in every province and territory.46 One recent study also noted the link
between Indigenous children in the child welfare system and overrepresentation
of Indigenous peoples within the criminal justice system, dubbing this connection
the “child-welfare-to-prison-pipeline.”47
[33] In a 2017 class action, the Ontario Superior Court confirmed the federal
government’s liability in negligence for loss of culture and identity caused to
thousands of Indigenous children who had been taken into permanent care and
placed in non-Indigenous foster homes from the 1960s to the 1980s (known as the
‘Sixties Scoop’).48 A similar class action on behalf of Indigenous children taken
into permanent care from the 1980s forward was initiated in March 2019.
[34] As we discussed above, although s 88 of the Indian Act did not automatically
result in delegating child welfare authority to the provinces, this was the federal
government’s intent and it is what eventually transpired (through intergovernmental
agreements). Accordingly, many credit s 88 for being the first cause of the ‘Sixties
Scoop’ and today’s current overrepresentation of Indigenous children in the child
welfare system.49 In our view, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of s 91(24) as
giving the federal government nearly unlimited power over Indigenous peoples, as
well its willingness to allow extensive provincial overlap, became the fertile ground
in which s 88 could grow. The SCC has now gone further by constitutionalizing
the effect of s 88 in Dick.
[35] It is now clear that the current approach to Indigenous child welfare,
endorsed by the majority judges in NIL/TU,O as “an example of flexible and cooperative federalism at work and at its best,”50 is having disastrous impacts on
Indigenous children and families. Recent developments, discussed below, have
highlighted the highly assimilative nature of the child welfare system in Canada
as it relates to Indigenous peoples. They have also revealed far less ‘cooperation’
between federal and provincial governments than the SCC judges supposed.
[36] The TRC has stated that “Canada’s child-welfare system has simply
continued the assimilation that the residential school system started,” and its first
five Calls to Action were directed at addressing significant problems identified with
Indigenous child welfare in Canada.51 The TRC highlighted jurisdictional disputes
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and neglect in relation to Indigenous child welfare as a key problem:
Jurisdictional responsibility for child welfare is intensely contested. Historically, the
federal government and provincial and territorial governments have tried to shift
responsibility for Aboriginal child services from one level of government to another. The
federal position is that responsibility for child and family services lies solely within the
jurisdiction of the provinces and territories. Canada contends that the federal government
is responsible for funding only on-reserve services. In contrast, the provinces maintain
that the federal government has constitutional responsibility for ‘Indians,’ and argue
that Ottawa has off-loaded that responsibility to the provinces to provide services to an
increasingly urban, non-reserve population.
The result is that there are often disputes over which level of government or department
is responsible for paying costs. The repercussions of these disputes can be serious, with
Aboriginal children paying the highest price—in particular, children with complex
developmental, mental health, and physical health issues.52

[37] In the 2016 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et
al. v Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs
Canada) case, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (CHRT) found that Canada
had discriminated against First Nations children by knowingly underfunding the
delivery of child welfare services in First Nations communities.53 Consistent with
a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of child welfare delivery on
reserve discussed above, the CHRT, unlike the SCC in the cases at bar, found that
primary jurisdiction (and human rights liability) over First Nations child welfare
fell to the federal government under s 91(24). The CHRT recognized that Canada
had the power to legislate over First Nations child welfare and chose not to, instead
taking “a programing and funding approach” to child welfare on reserve.54 The
CHRT also recognized that the application of provincial child welfare legislation
and standards through the enactment of s 88 of the Indian Act was a deliberate
choice of the federal government. According to the CHRT, the fact that Canada
did not directly deliver the service on reserve could not be the end of the matter
and could not be used as an excuse to allow Canada to escape scrutiny because,
… despite not actually delivering the service, [Canada] exerts a significant amount of
influence over the provision of those services. Ultimately, it is [Canada] that has the power
to remedy inadequacies of child and family services and improve outcomes for children and
families residing on First Nations reserves and in the Yukon….55

[38] The CHRT further found that Canada’s underfunding of First Nation child
welfare services creates an incentive to take First Nations children into care as a first
resort rather than a last resort, thereby contributing to the mass overrepresentation
of First Nations children in state and foster care across the country. This led the
CHRT to liken today’s child welfare system to the IRS system, by removing children
from their families, languages, cultures, and communities, and also by continuing
the pervasive pattern of government control over the lives of Indigenous peoples:
Similar to the Residential Schools era, today, the fate and future of many First Nations
52
53
54
55

Ibid at 142.
First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v Attorney General of Canada
(for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 2 [Caring Society].
Ibid at para 83.
Ibid at para 85.

NIL/TU,O and Native Child v BCGSEU and CEPUC

35

children is still being determined by the government, whether it is through the application
of restrictive and inadequate funding formulas or through bilateral agreements with the
provinces.56

[39] Finally, the CHRT found that the federal government’s stated policy
approach of funding levels similar to the provinces (a standard which the CHRT
found Canada had, on the facts, failed to meet) was itself discriminatory. On
this, the CHRT held that an approach that seeks to mirror funding provided by
the provinces and territories is not consistent with substantive equality as it does
not consider “the distinct needs and circumstances of First Nations children and
families living on reserve, including their cultural, historical and geographical needs
and circumstances.”57 This finding was based on both international and domestic
human rights principles.58 According to the CHRT, in order to meet the governing
standard of equality, both funding and services on reserve must meet the needs of
First Nations children and families and be culturally appropriate. Such a principle
likely has application to other service areas affecting Indigenous peoples.
[40] This understanding of substantive equality is supported by precedent. The
principle of substantive equality respects and celebrates difference, recognizing that
all human beings are equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration.59 In
cases involving services provided to Anglophone and Francophone communities,
the SCC has affirmed that substantive equality can mean distinctive content in the
provision of similar services, depending on the nature and purpose of the services
in issue, as well as the characteristics of the population to be served.60 Further, in
the recent case of Ewert v Canada about corrections services to Indigenous peoples,
the SCC held that it is a “long-standing principle of Canadian law that substantive
equality requires more than simply equal treatment.”61
[41] In our view, by stating that child welfare services must meet the actual needs
and circumstances of First Nations children and families, and not be assimilative in
nature, the CHRT’s decision effectively recognizes that First Nations must exercise
meaningful control over the design and delivery of child welfare as a matter of
domestic human rights law. In other words, Caring Society implicitly frames the
exercise of Indigenous self-determination as a matter of substantive equality and
human rights.
[42] Further, we understand this principle to require more than simply having
provincial governments accommodate Indigenous peoples within their laws.
Although such an approach was commended by the SCC in NIL/TU,O,62 in practice
this often leads to a patchwork of laws across the country, with some Indigenous
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groups receiving greater protections than others.63 More importantly, this continues
control by a non-Indigenous government, which is assimilative in principle. The
problem has been succinctly stated as follows by a Carrier Sekani Tribal Council
member in 1983: “Only Indian people can design systems for Indians. Anything
other than that is assimilation.”64
[43] The principle we have distilled from the Caring Society decision
(effectively, a human right for Indigenous people to exercise meaningful control
over the design and delivery of essential services) is in tension with service regimes
that place all legislative power over Indigenous peoples in federal and provincial
governments. Thus, although the CHRT did not go so far as to say that s 88 and the
Dick decision result in discriminatory treatment of Indigenous peoples (as those
legal questions were not directly raised in the case before it), this appears to us to
be a clear implication of the ruling.65
iv. Specific Harms in Relation to Labour Jurisdiction
[44] In the decisions below, the question of jurisdiction over labour matters
was seen to be merely incidental to, or flowing from, the determination of which
government had authority over the primary activity of the employees in question
(e.g., delivery of child and family services). This treats labour and employment
jurisdiction as not independently important to Indigenous peoples. Similarly, it was
argued that, since none of the contested labour regimes in issue (those of Canada,
British Columbia, and Ontario) were very different from each other, the choice
of provincial jurisdiction over federal jurisdiction was of no real consequence
to the affected Indigenous organizations. This ignores the fact that, although the
substantive standards between the contested legislation might be similar, Indigenous
nations and agencies may nonetheless have good reason to resist the imposition
of one over the other.
[45] On one level, Indigenous resistance may be a principled stand against an
outside entity’s imposition of identities and systems upon them. As observed by
Maggie Wente:
The positions taken by Native Child in its argument to the Supreme Court demonstrate
clear resistance to the non-Aboriginal third party, the Communications, Energy, and
Paperworkers Union (CEP) purporting to define the aspects that are at the core of
Aboriginal people’s identities and aspirations, and specifically attempting to define for
the Court the purposes and aspirations of Native Child as an agency. It is obvious to most
people familiar with Aboriginal peoples that the attempted imposition of identity and
aspirations by a non-Aboriginal party strikes at the heart of the modern political struggles
63
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of Aboriginal peoples for self-determination in a “post-colonial” world.66

Wente also suggests that another source of resistance may be “scepticism of settlerimposed methods of alternative dispute resolution in the workplace.”67
[46] At another level, there are practical reasons why an Indigenous organization
might choose one labour regime over another. One obvious reason is to have
a consistent set of rules apply to all agencies and entities operating under one
Indigenous government. The SCC’s ruling in the decisions below did not provide
a clear, consistent rule for First Nation governments, but continued the problem of
arbitrarily subjecting different sub-units of a First Nation government to different
labour regimes. This is described by Wente:
There are myriad other kinds of Aboriginal organizations that will not fit into the neatly
defined box of “unquestionably provincial” activities defined by the Supreme Court
in these cases. For instance, it is not clear how, for example, First Nations-controlled
organizations that provide technical advisory services (likely provincial in nature) to First
Nations reserve communities (likely federal in nature) about resource development (likely
federal in nature) that occurs on lands subject to treaty (while the lands are provincial in
nature, developments may affect Aboriginal and Treaty rights, which are federal in nature)
will fit neatly into either box after the functional test is carried out.
… In reality, it seems the result may be that the same First Nation’s employment relations
could be provincially regulated for some branches of their operations, while remaining
federally regulated for others. NIL/TU,O, in its argument to the Court, pointed out this
absurdity.68

[47] As the NIL/TU,O analysis is also applied by the courts to determine
which government has jurisdiction over human rights complaints, First Nations
experience similar problems regarding human rights jurisdiction. Wente points out
that this can result in First Nations governments arbitrarily benefitting from certain
protections of Indigenous collective rights and legal traditions for some sub-units of
its operations and not for others. This includes specific protections for Aboriginal
and treaty rights and legal traditions in the Canadian Human Rights Act that came
into effect in 2008.69
[48] In our view, Indigenous governments that are re-building their governance
capacity and overcoming the impacts of colonialism do not need additional barriers
impeding the management of their affairs.
C.

An Alternative Approach

[49] We start by pointing out the obvious: interpretations of the Constitution can
evolve. It is a long-held principle of constitutional interpretation that the written
Constitution (including both the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Constitution Act,
1982) must be given a broad interpretation that is attuned to changing circumstances.
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This has been variously called “progressive interpretation” or a “living tree”
interpretation.70
[50] Arguments for a shift in the interpretation of s 91(24) are not new. In
1991, Professor Bruce Ryder wrote that “there is significant unexplored potential
within the existing framework of Canadian constitutional law for promoting the
autonomy of … the First Nations.”71 As discussed earlier, a number of scholars
have called upon the courts to adopt an interpretation of s 91(24) consistent with
treaty federalism based on the historic, nation-to-nation relationship that existed
on these lands long before Confederation. We agree that this historic relationship
militates in favour of a new approach.
[51] In addition to treaty federalism, however, a number of other legal principles
militate in favour of a new interpretation of s 91(24). These principles all point in
one direction and their cumulative force leads to the inescapable conclusion that this
change is both necessary and overdue. We reject any suggestion that such a change
requires a constitutional amendment and is beyond the purview of the courts; quite
the contrary, the exercise here is one of constitutional interpretation—the bread
and butter of the courts.
i. Conformity with the Charter
[52] It is clear that the interpretation of one part of the Constitution should be
mindful of the rest of its text. In other words, courts must strive to harmonize their
interpretation of a provision, such as s 91(24), to be consistent with the rest of the
text, including provisions within the Charter.72
[53] We devoted significant attention in part 2B of our analysis to describing
the harms that have been inflicted upon Indigenous peoples by the courts’ current
interpretation of s 91(24). We saw that the National Inquiry into Missing and
Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls characterized interjurisdictional neglect of
Indigenous peoples (which the current approach to s 91(24) facilitates) as a violation
of s 7 of the Charter. The CHRT in Caring Society suggested that the imposition
of provincial standards on Indigenous groups violates substantive equality, which
is protected under both s 15 of the Charter and quasi-constitutional human rights
legislation. Consistent with the interpretive principles discussed above, we ought to
discard an interpretation of s 91(24) that implicates serious Charter rights violations.
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ii. The Principles of Federalism, Protection of Minorities and Subsidiarity
[54] In Reference re Secession of Quebec, the SCC confirmed that the
“Constitution of Canada” is not limited to its constitutional texts but embraces
unwritten rules that guide the interpretation of the written text.73 Here, a number of
unwritten principles support an interpretation of s 91(24) that respects Indigenous
self-determination.
[55] In Ref re Secession, the SCC emphasized the significance of federalism as a
fundamental principle underlying our Constitution and underlined that the principle
promotes diversity in governance.74 The SCC linked the principle of federalism
with the protection of distinct cultural and political traditions:
Federalism was a legal response to the underlying political and cultural realities that
existed at Confederation and continue to exist today.… The federal-provincial division
of powers was a legal recognition of the diversity that existed among the initial members
of Confederation, and manifested a concern to accommodate that diversity within a single
nation by granting significant powers to provincial governments.75

As noted by Ryder, Indigenous groups have a claim similar to that of the provinces:
that the federalism principle supports their autonomy/self-determination in
governance, given the important goal of protecting their distinctive cultural and
political traditions.76
[56] This notion of diversity underlying federalism was expanded in Ref re
Secession to inform a further independent constitutional principle of respect for
minorities. The SCC observed that the protection of minority rights was clearly an
essential consideration in the constitutional structure at the time of Confederation,
and that principle was further reflected in a number of provisions in both the
Constitution Acts, 1867 and 1982. We believe that this principle of respect for
minorities bolsters the need to interpret s 91(24) consistent with substantive
equality, which (according to the principle emerging from Caring Society and other
precedents) is linked to Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.
[57] Finally, the principle of federalism, through promoting diversity in
governance, spawned yet another principle, that of subsidiarity. This principle first
emerged (though unnamed) in Ref re Secession when the Court noted that “the
federal structure of our country facilitates democratic participation by distributing
power to the government thought to be most suited to achieving the particular
societal objective having regard to this diversity.”77 Later in 114957 Canada
Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town), the SCC named this the
“principle of subsidiarity” and set out its contours more specifically: “[t]his is the
proposition that law-making and implementation are often best achieved at a level
of government that is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens affected
and thus most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and to population
73
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diversity.”78 The principle of subsidiarity reinforces an interpretation of s 91(24)
that recognizes a right of Indigenous governments to self-determine in matters
affecting Indigenous peoples.
iii. Reconciliation and the Honour of the Crown
[58] In Daniels, a 2016 case about the interpretation of s 91(24), the Supreme
Court clarified that several recent actions taken by Canada signal an overall goal
to achieve reconciliation:
The constitutional changes, the apologies for historic wrongs, a growing appreciation
that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people are partners in Confederation, the Report of
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, and the Final Report of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of Canada, all indicate that reconciliation with all of Canada’s
Aboriginal peoples is Parliament’s goal.79

Based on this, Parliament’s overall goal of reconciliation ought to inform the
interpretation of the Constitution, meaning we ought to be prepared to discard the
older, problematic interpretation of s 91(24) in favour of ones that do not perpetuate
assimilation and cause harm to Indigenous peoples.80
[59] Further to this, the honour of the Crown has been called a “constitutional
principle.”81 It has been employed to impute certain conduct to the Crown, including
giving a broad and purposive interpretation to Crown promises and imputing a
desire on the Crown to diligently fulfil such promises.82 Based on this, we believe
the honour of the Crown is relevant here to compel us to prefer interpretations of
the Constitution that are consistent with commitments made by the governments
in recent years (and not simply viewing these as empty political commitments).
This includes Canada’s commitment to reconciliation, reviving the nation-tonation relationship, and respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration).
[60] In July 2017, the government of Canada released a policy setting out
ten principles it intends to honour in respect of its relationship with Indigenous
peoples.83 The very first principle recognizes that relations with Indigenous peoples
need to be based on their right to self-determination, including the inherent right to
self-government. The fourth principle recognizes that “Indigenous self-government
is a part of Canada’s evolving system of cooperative federalism and distinct orders
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of government.”84 Other principles emphasize the importance of reconciliation
and respecting the Declaration. Canada’s policy commitments ought to inform
the honour of the Crown.85
[61] In our view, these public and policy commitments weigh in favour of an
interpretation of s 91(24) that respects self-determination and favours a horizontal
as opposed to a hierarchical relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the federal
and provincial governments.
iv. The Presumption of Conformity with International Law
[62] Finally, compliance with public international law militates in favour of a
new approach to s 91(24). The federal government has committed to respect the
substantive rights to equality, security, and health and well-being of minorities
within Canada in a variety of international instruments.86 As suggested in part 2,
the current approach to s 91(24) has failed to do this, while a new interpretation of
s 91(24) as protecting Indigenous self-determination would.
[63] Further, since 2016, Canada has endorsed the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples without qualification. The Declaration makes
it clear that commitments to protect the basic minimum rights of peoples include
Indigenous peoples. Further, a central principle of the Declaration is the right to
self-determination. In this regard, Article 3 provides that “Indigenous peoples have
the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
[64] It is a well-established rule of statutory interpretation that Canadian law,
including the Constitution, will be presumed to conform to international law unless
the federal government has explicitly provided otherwise within the text of a law.87
Consistent with this rule, there have been a number of cases where the SCC has
used international law instruments to interpret the Constitution.88 Although some
have questioned whether the Declaration benefits from this rule given its status as
a declaration as opposed to a ratified convention or treaty, it is clear that the SCC
has used other analogous international declarations to interpret the Constitution;
thus, such arguments are without foundation.89
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[65] In any event, the principle of self-determination itself is binding in Canada
because it is explicitly recognized under instruments that Canada has already
ratified, separate and apart from the Declaration. For example, Article 1 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by Canada on May
19, 1976, recognizes that “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.” Further, in addition to the principle
of self-determination Canada has publicly committed to recognize, the right to
self-determination is now widely acknowledged as international customary law,
meaning it is binding on Canada irrespective of ratification through a convention
or a treaty.90
[66] Thus, we find that the customary law principle of self-determination, the
Declaration, and other international commitments made by Canada support a new
interpretation of s 91(24) that respects Indigenous self-determination.

3.

Conclusion

[67] The Indigenous people for whom the NIL/TU,O and Native Child agencies
were created ought to have the right to choose which labour relations regime should
govern their employees. This is the minimum right to which an interpretation of s
91(24) that respects self-determination entitles them. For NIL/TU,O, their choice
is the federal regime, and for Native Child, it is Ontario’s regime.
[68] We emphasize that the right to self-determination also includes the right
to choose a labour regime created pursuant to the exercise of self-government by
Indigenous communities, where such regimes exist. In the cases at bar, however,
neither Indigenous agency asserted that the labour relations regime developed by
their Indigenous governments should prevail (as neither had yet developed such
legal regimes). This does not preclude them from making such arguments at a later
date when such regimes are in existence.
[69] Further, we would add that, given the harm that the denial of Indigenous
jurisdiction has caused to Indigenous peoples and that reconciliation mandates
that such harm be atoned for and action be taken to change behaviour, federal
and provincial governments therefore have responsibilities to support Indigenous
peoples in the development and running of such regimes (if that is the aspiration
of the Indigenous nation in question).91 This is also consistent with Article 4 of the
Declaration, which states: “Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to selfdetermination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating
to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their
autonomous functions.”
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[70]
We acknowledge that shifting our approach to s 91(24) inevitably raises
a number of questions, such as: What is the full extent of Indigenous peoples’
jurisdiction? Do the limits on government power in the Charter apply to Indigenous
law-making, or should other instruments (international law or Indigenous
constitutions) supply the parameters between individual and collective rights?
When is Indigenous jurisdiction exclusive and when it is concurrent with provincial
or federal powers? When there is concurrent jurisdiction, when will Indigenous
law supersede provincial or federal laws and vice versa? What legal test governs
questions of ‘conflicts’ between laws? Given our disposition in this case, it is not
necessary for us to answer these questions.
[71] That said, we wish to emphasize that these varied and complex questions
should not dissuade us from making this long-overdue change. Judicial courage
is required here. We must remind ourselves that human beings have a remarkable
capacity to adapt to changes in their societies. In the same way that they adapted to
same-sex marriage and Indigenous treaty rights to fish for a moderate livelihood, to
give but two examples, Canadians will adapt to the idea of Indigenous peoples as
another order of government with both the power to choose what laws will apply
to them as well as the ability to exercise their inherent law-making powers. In this
regard, they can look to our neighbours to the south for reassurance. Although not
perfect, U.S. law has included much more robust recognition of Indigenous peoples’
inherent right of self-determination for many years.92
[72] Moreover, it is unnecessary to answer these questions all at once. Like the
development of other constitutional doctrines, a body of law on these issues can
be developed over time as cases are heard by the courts.
[73] In the NIL/TU,O appeal, we find that the British Columbia Labour Relations
Board does not have jurisdiction over NIL/TU,O labour relations because NIL/
TU,O has not consented to the Board having jurisdidtion. Likewise, in the Native
Child appeal, we find that the Canada Industrial Relations Board does not have
jurisdiction because Native Child has not consented to its jurisdiction. In each case,
the Indigenous child and family agencies can choose which labour regime they
want to be governed by until such as time as they develop their own.
Appeals allowed with costs throughout.
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